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Abstract
This paper tests “Bad Policy” Hypothesis which refers to the Great Moderation in the US. We 
examine this hypothesis by simulating model based impulse response functions for the both pre-
Volcker period and post 1982 period. Deriving and simulating standard New Keynesian DSGE Model
explicitly, we find that while post 1982 policy i.e. active policy, is consistent with the unique stable 
equilibrium characteristics; pre-Volcker or passive monetary policy generates equilibrium 
indeterminacy. Moreover, our simulated-impulse response functions show that the response of 
inflation and the output gap in post 82 period is weaker than the macroeconomic responses of the pre-
Volcker period. 
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11  INTRODUCTION
The significant reduction in the volatility of both output growth and inflation in the US 
starting from the 1980s is known as the Great Moderation. The literature on the Great 
Moderation mostly focuses on trying to find an answer for what caused changes in both output 
growth and inflation in the US. In the Great Moderation context, some studies argue that pre-
Volcker period –as a passive policy period – has been associated with a “Bad Policy” in terms 
of weak monetary policy response to inflation as well as output gap. Thus, according to these 
studies, pre-Volker monetary policy was responsible for high inflation rates experienced in the 
US. On the other hand, several studies conclude that after the start of Volcker’s term as a 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve in 1980s, monetary policy became more active and hence
named as a “Good Policy” in terms of reacting to inflation and output gaps strong. Therefore,
these studies conclude that the volatility of both inflation and output has declined after 1980s in 
the US.
The literature on the US Great Moderation along with the tests of the“Bad Policy” 
Hypothesis is vast. Orphanides (2001) uses forward looking policy rules and finds a strong 
reaction to inflation forecasts during both pre-Volcker and post 1982. According to 
Orphanides, monetary policy was a source of instability during the Great Moderation. He also 
finds that prior to Volcker, monetary policy was too activist in reacting to perceived output 
gaps. Mcconnell and Quiros (2000) test and find a structural break in the volatility of the US 
output growth in 1984. According to Mcconnel and Quiros, the break in the durables is 
coincident with a break in the proportion of durables output accounted by inventories.
Mcconnel and Quiros (2000) use Markov-Switching model and their data covers 1953:02-
1999:02. Milani (2005) introduces learning to Great Moderation literature. He finds evidence
of regime switch of US monetary policy from passive to active. Furthermore, Milani also 
shows the feedback coefficient to inflation was well above one in the 1960s and 1970s. 
According to Milani, monetary policy was not leading to macroeconomic instability. Gambetti, 
et.al.(2006) find that the contribution of real demand and supply shocks varies over time and 
hence changes the volatility of inflation and output. They also conclude that the monetary 
policy has a small role in terms of evolution of the persistence and volatility. Gambetti, 
et.al.(2006) use Markov-Chain Monte Carlo Methods as well as Time Varying Coefficients 
VAR over the period 1960:01 -2003:02.
2 Cecchetti, et.al (2007) examine international comparisons to understand US inflation 
dynamics. They find that Great Inflation and Inflation stabilization are linked due to the 
changes in the monetary policy regimes of several G-7 countries. Gali and Gambetti (2007) 
conclude that the Great Moderation can be explained by a sharp fall in the contribution of non 
– technology shocks to the variance of output. Moreover, according to Gali and Gambetti 
(2007), large changes in the patterns of co-movements among output, hours and labor 
productivity might cause the remarkable decline in macroeconomic volatility experienced by 
the US economy. Canova, et.al. (2007) examine the role of expectations in the Great 
Moderation Episode. They find that including or excluding expectations hardly changes the 
economic explanation of the Great Moderation. Furthermore, their results gives that
contribution of sunspot shocks to output growth and inflation volatility do not line up well. 
Canova, et.al. (2007) use Bayesian Approach and also estimate New Keynesian DSGE Model. 
Their data is over the period 1960:01–1979:02 and 1982:04–1997:04. 
Benati and Surico (2007) show that VAR analysis may misinterpret good policy for 
good luck. Moreover, they find that VAR evidence is inconsistent with the good policy 
explanation of the Great Moderation. According to Benati and Surico, VARs may fail to 
capture of the role of monetary policy played in recent macroeconomic stability. Furthermore, 
they argue that estimating DSGE models (with passive policy) has the potential to discriminate 
between the “good policy” and “good luck” explanations of the Great Moderation. Lubik and 
Schorfheide (2004) use Likelihood-based estimation of DSGE Model and Bayesian Approach. 
They estimate New Keynesian DSGE Model and their data covers 1960:01–1979:02, 1979:03–
1997:04 and 1982:04–1997:04. Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) find that post 1982 US 
monetary policy is consistent with determinacy, whereas the pre-Volcker period is not. They 
estimate DSGE Model without restricting the parameters to the determinacy region. Likewise, 
this paper also tests whether or not pre-Volcker (or passive) period generates equilibrium 
indeterminacy. Moreover, we, then, examine if post-1982 (or active) period is consistent with 
the unique determinate equilibrium for the case of the US. 
This paper is organized as follows: First, we set up New Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic 
General Equilibrium Model as a benchmark model. Then, we derive three equilibrium 
conditions of the model economy and solve the model dynamics explicitly. Section 3 provides 
calibration and simulation methodology of the study in detail. Section 4 discusses the results 
and finally Section 5 concludes.
32  THE MODEL
The model economy2 is based on New Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General 
Equilibrium Model setting. In this study, we, first, set up and solve maximization problems of 
the consumers and the firms explicitly. Second, we express equilibrium conditions for this New 
Keynesian economy by introducing and closing the model with monetary policy, i.e. simple 
interest rate rule. Third, we solve the model and examine equilibrium characteristics for both 
determinacy and indeterminacy. The simulation mechanics of the model is also introduced by 
using the similar approach for solving and simulating KPR Models.
2. 1  The Household
The representative infinitely-lived utility maximizer household solves the following 
problem:
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for t = 0, 1, 2, … plus solvency constraint.
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Now, use Lagrangian and get the first order conditions to find the optimal demand:
Then, the optimal allocation of expenditures can be written as:
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2 See Gali’s forthcoming textbook for this model economy derivation in detail. - Gali, J., (2007), “Lectures on 
Monetary Policy, Inflation and the Business Cycle”, Lecture Notes, (February 2007), chapter-III. 
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Then, by using the utility specification, log-linear optimal conditions become:
tttt ncpw   (10)
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Equation (11) is consumer’s Euler equation where tt Qi log  represents the “nominal interest 
rate” and  log  is the “discount rate”.
Finally, ad-hoc money demand can be written as:
tttt iypm  (12)
2. 2  The Firms
We assume that there is a continuum of firms that are indexed by ]1,0[i . In this 
model, firms are monopolistically competitive and each produces a differentiated good in the 
economy. The firms are setting their prices based on Calvo – Price Setting (1983), i.e. prices 
are sticky and firms are able to reset their prices in any given period with the probability 
of 1 , which is independent across firms. Price stickiness is indexed by ]1,0[ and implied 
average price duration is )1/(1  .
The production function is identical for all firms and that is:
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Aggregate price dynamics can be written as:
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5dividing (14) by 1tP  gives:
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and log-linearizing (15) around zero inflation steady state gives:
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Equation (16) can be also written as:
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Firm’s optimal price setting problem then becomes:
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for k =1, 2,…
Then, optimality condition is:
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Then, flexible prices, in which 0 , can be expressed as:
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 tmc (symmetric equilibrium) (29)
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2. 3  Equilibrium     
Goods market clears as follows:
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3 For the case of decreasing returns to scale, see Gali’s textbook on Monetary Policy, Inflation and Business 
Cycles, February 2007, forthcoming.
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Now, we can rewrite consumer’s Euler equation (11) and one can get:
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Labor Market clears as follows:
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taking logs of the above expression is then:
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Marginal Cost and Output can be written by using the following expressions:
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Now, New Keynesian Phillips Curve can be written as:
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and Dynamic IS Equation is: 
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where ntr  is the “natural rate of interest, given by;
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Monetary policy - by determining ti  closes the model.
2. 4  Monetary Policy 
Suppose monetary policy follows the following simple interest rate rule:
    ttytt yi    (54)
where t  is exogenous shock with zero mean, and ty  is the output gap realized at time t. 
Monetary policy reacts the economy with   and y  policy response parameters.
Hence, combining (51), (52) and (54) gives;
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and according to Bullard and Mitra (2002);
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92. 5  Solving the Model
The economy is characterized by three New Keynesian Equations (51), (52) and (54): 
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where ntr  is the natural rate and v  is a shock. Rewrite these equations in a matrix form as a 
linear system of equations:
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use Jordan Decomposition and express the system as follows:
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The left-hand-side of this system is not a differential equations type of vector. Hence, rewrite 
this system as a differential equation system in order to solve the model. 
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The last two vector difference, 
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Rewrite the previous system as:
            
























































1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
3
2
1
1
1
1
00
00
00
tt
tt
tt
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
rE
E
yE
r
y
R
r
y
PP
r
y




            (61)
now, multiplying both sides by matrix 1P :
       


























































1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
11
3
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
00
00
00
tt
tt
tt
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
rE
E
yE
r
y
PRP
r
y
PPP
r
y
P 



      (62)
note that 11   ttt vrr     and hence   ttt rrE 1 . Hence, ( 111 )   tttt vrEr .
Furthermore, call ( 1ty 1tt yE ) = y and ( 1t 1ttE  ) =  .
Hence, the system becomes:
     


















































1
1
1
11
3
2
1
1
1
1
1
00
00
00
t
y
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
v
PRP
r
y
P
r
y
P 





 (63)
Now, define the following expressions:
        1
1
1
1
1




 










t
t
t
t
Q
r
y
P     and     t
t
t
t
Q
r
y
P 










 1   
Hence,
       



























1
1
1
1
3
2
1
1
00
00
00
t
y
ttt
v
PRPQQ 





(64)
or, equivalently, 
   

















































1
1
1
1
3
2
1
3
2
1
13
12
11
00
00
00
t
y
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
v
PRP
q
q
q
q
q
q






(65)
The above expression is a linear system of difference equations. Note that this system has two 
control variables (output gap and inflation), one predetermined variable (natural rate of interest
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as a state) and one state variable which is natural rate of interest, tr . Moreover, the system has 
three lambdas: 21 , and 3 . Suppose that 1 >1, 2 >1 and 3 <1.
In this case,
# of predetermined variables = # of stable eigenvalues (i.e. 3 ). Therefore, the only way 
to have a stable solution is hence defining 021  tt qq for all t. In other words, from the 
previous representation of the system it can be written as:
















1
1
1
1
1111
t
y
ttt
v
PRPqq 

 (66)
and,
















1
1
1
1
2212
t
y
ttt
v
PRPqq 

 (67)
It is now obvious that since 021  tt qq for all t, y along with   has no impact on the 
variables of the system. Thus, even though agents re-form their expectations, there is “only one 
path” for the control variables and this path leads a unique stable determinate Rational 
Expectations Equilibrium.
To show this in another way recall t
t
t
t
Q
r
y
P 










 1  and rewrite this expression as follows:
    































t
t
t
t
t
t
r
y
ppp
ppp
q
q
q

...
232221
131211
3
2
1
(68)
since 021  tt qq  for all t, 
0131211  ttt rppyp  (69)
0232221  ttt rppyp  (70)
and from these equations,  each control variable (output gap and inflation) can be pinned down
as a function of the state variable, tr .
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So far, we have seen the determinacy case. However, if the number of stable 
eigenvalues are more than the number of predetermined variables (natural rate of interest), then 
021  tt qq  for all t. 
Recall system (66) and (67):
















1
1
1
1
1111
t
y
ttt
v
PRPqq 

    ;    
















1
1
1
1
2212
t
y
ttt
v
PRPqq 


But, now since 021  tt qq for all t, forecast errors do have impact on the system 
variables. This leads equilibrium indeterminacy instead of unique equilibrium. In this case, 
forecast errors; y  and   drive business cycles. These errors are also called sunspot shocks.
2. 6 The Mechanics
The mechanics of the standard New Keynesian Model can be grasped by using a 
general approach to solving KPR models4. Hence, now consider the RBC model’s mechanics
and see how one can calibrate and simulate New Keynesian DSGE Model through this
process5.
So now, instead of New Keynesian Model variables, we consider RBC Model variables; 
ttt akc ,,  and examine the model mechanics as follows:
Recall; 










t
t
t
q
q
q
3
2
1
=










d
b
0
   or, equivalently,  






















d
b
a
k
c
P
t
t
t 0
1
  






















d
bP
a
k
c
t
t
t 0
  (71)
excluding zero value from the system;
                                                
4 See Cochrane, John H. (2001). “Solving Real Business Cycles Models by Solving Systems of First Order
Conditions”, Lecture Notes, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago, page 14.
5 In the RBC Model, instead, there are one control variable, Consumption, one state variable, Capital and one 
exogenous variable, Technology. So, we only assume tq1 = 0, since then, the number of predetermined variables 
will be equal to the stable eigenvalues. This in fact leads a unique determinate equilibrium.
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       













d
b
P
a
k
c
t
t
t
]3:2,[ (72)
                













 
t
t
t
a
k
c
P
d
b 1]3:2,[ (73)
and in order to solve the system above, rewrite as:
    





 
t
t
a
k
P
d
b 1]3:2,3:2[ (74)
substituting system (74) into (72) gives the following expression:
  














t
t
t
t
t
a
k
PP
a
k
c
1]3:2,3:2[]3:2,[ (75)
for tc , the decision rule can be hence written as:



 
t
t
t a
k
PPc 1]3:2,3:2[]3:2,1[  or, 



t
t
kact a
k
c , (76)
Therefore, now, we can simulate the above system using the decision rule of consumption.
Furthermore, based on the decision rule, we can also simulate;
         1,
1
1 ]1,3:2[]3:2,3:2[]1,3:2[ 

 






t
t
t
kac
t
t R
a
k
WW
a
k  (77)
and finally we generate shocks by;
111   ttt aa  (78)
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3  CALIBRATION and SIMULATION 
In this section, we calibrate New Keynesian Model and then simulate by using the 
mechanism discussed in the previous section6. For the calibration exercise, we have three 
periods7: (i) whole sample or mixed policy period (1954-2008), (ii) pre-Volcker period (1954-
1979), (iii) post-82 period (1980-2008). For the mixed policy period, we take the following 
calibration values8:
99.0 ,    = 1,  = 0.0024,   = 0.5, 5.0,5.1  y . 4,3/2  
for the pre-Volcker passive period calibration, we choose;
99.0 ,   = 1,  = 0.77,   = 0.5, 17.0,77.0  y ,
and, for the post-82 active period calibration, we choose;
99.0 ,   = 1,  = 0.77,   = 0.5, 30.0,19.2  y .
Having used the calibration values above, we solve the model for both pre-Volcker 
period (Bad policy) and post 82 period (Good policy), then analyze the equilibrium 
characteristics. In this paper, we only consider monetary policy shocks and use the following 
shock process in order to get the simulated-impulse response functions of the economy:
Set .0ˆ ntr (no real shocks) and let tv  follow an AR (1) process that is:
       vttvt vv   1 (79)
Now, by using calibrated values and generating shocks, we are now able to plot the impulse-
response functions of the output, inflation and the nominal interest rates to one unit of v shock.
                                                
6 All MATLAB codes for the simulation, impulse responses and graphs can  be provided upon request.
7 The whole sample data period (1954:03-2008:01) is selected and extended based on Gali and Gambetti (2007); 
the pre-Volcker period data (1954:03, 1979:02) is based on Milani (2005); and post 82 period data sample (1979:03 
– 2008: 01) is selected based on Milani (2005), Lubik and Schorfheide (2004).  
8 Whole sample calibration is taken from Walsh’s Textbook and Gali’s forthcoming Textbook on Monetary 
Policy, Inflation and Business Cycles, February 2007. Passive policy and active policy calibrations are taken from 
Canova and Gambetti (2008) as well as Gali’s Textbook.
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4  RESULTS 
We first find that New Keynesian Model generates a unique stable Rational 
Expectations Equilibrium for the mixed policy (1954-2008) by using the suggested parameters 
discussed in the previous section. Moreover, Figure 69 gives the simulated-impulse response 
functions of the output gap, inflation and the nominal interest rates for the mixed period –whole 
sample case. From this figure, it can be seen that while inflation has a small response to shock 
with persistency, both output gap and interest rates response to shock immediately. 
Obviuously, after the second period, the effect of one unit of shock starts to die away from the 
system. However, it takes about 8 periods for the variables to reach their steady state values. 
Second, we examined New Keynesian Model for the pre-Volcker period. We find that 
simulation of New Keynesian DSGE Model by using the suggested calibration for the pre-
Volcker period generates indeterminate equilibria10. Furthermore, Figure 7 represents the 
responses of the output gap, inflation and the nominal interest rates to one unit of “v” shock as 
we consider pre-Volcker “bad policy” period. In this case, inflation, output as well as interest 
rates response to one unit of shock. In this figure, note that the response of the inflation to 
shock is higher than the response of the output. Also, the effect of the shock on both inflation 
and output gap is high i.e inflation and output rise a lot in the second period, then the impact 
starts to decrease as time passes.
Third, we simulate and examine equilibrium characteristics of New Keynesian Model 
for the post-82 period. We find that simulation of New Keynesian DSGE Model by using the 
suggested calibration for the post-82 period generates determinate unique equilibrium. Figure 8
represents the responses of the output gap, inflation and the nominal interest rates to one unit of 
“v” shock as we consider post 82 (good policy) period. Now, comparing impulse response 
functions of pre-Volcker period (Figure 7) and post 82 period (Figure 8) is crucial. From the 
Figure 8, it is obvious that the response of inflation and the output gap in post 82 period is
weaker than the responses of the pre-Volcker period. In other words, if we give a same one unit 
of “v” shock to each period, this shock will raise the inflation rate and output gap higher in pre-
Volcker period than it does in post 82 period. This means that the effect of the shock is much 
stronger in the pre-Volcker period. By this result, one can also clarify that pre-Volcker period 
was a sort of “bad” policy in terms of monetary policy reaction to both inflation and the output 
gap.
                                                
9 See appendix for all figures.
10 MATLAB codes regarding the indeterminacy solution is avaliable upon request.
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5 CONCLUSION
This paper tests “Bad Policy” Hypothesis which refers to the Great Moderation in 
the US. We examine this hypothesis by simulating model based impulse response 
functions for the both pre-Volcker period and post 1982 period. First, the model economy 
–New Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Model has been set up with 
consumers, firms and monetary policy. Second, we derived the all optimality conditions in 
this economy and obtained the equilibrium conditions based on three NK equations.  Then, 
having solved the model in matrix form, we analyzed equilibrium characteristics: 
determinacy and indeterminacy. Fourth, we delve deeper into the model dynamics and 
showed how the model mechanics work for a simulation exercise. The next step was based 
on calibration and simulation of the model in order to examine equilibrium characteristics 
in both pre-Volcker period and Post-82 period. After doing this, we gave a monetary 
policy “v” shock to the system and obtained impulse response functions of inflation, 
output gap and nominal interest rate. Our main finding is that while post 1982 policy (i.e. 
active policy) is consistent with the unique stable equilibrium characteristics; pre-Volcker 
or passive monetary policy generates equilibrium indeterminacy. This result is consistent 
with the literature of the indeterminacy tests of the Great Moderation11. Furthermore, our 
simulated-impulse response functions show that the response of inflation and the output 
gap in post 82 period is weaker than the responses of the pre-Volcker period. In other 
words, if we give a same one unit of “v” shock to each period, this shock will raise the 
inflation rate and output gap higher in pre-Volcker period than it does in post 82 period. 
This means that the effect of the shock is much stronger in the pre-Volcker period. A 
future study may then use our simulated –impulse response functions and compare them 
with real – data impulse response functions for the both pre-Volcker and post 82 periods.
This future goal is one of the main motivations to present this paper as well.
                                                
11 See Lubik, T., Schorfheide, F. (2003). “Testing for Indeterminacy: An Application to US Monetary Policy”, 
American Economic Reviw, (June 2003), pp. 1-51.
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Appendix
       Figure 1: Change in Consumer Prices (1954 – 2008)
    Figure 2: US Output Growth (1954 – 2008)
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    Figure 3: Change in the Effective Fed Funds rates (1954 – 2008)
   Figure 4: Descriptive Statistics of the Pre-Volcker Output Growth
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   Figure 5: Descriptive Statistics of the Post-1982 Output Growth
Figure 6: Impulse Response Function of NK Model with Determinacy
(Mixed Policy – Whole Sample)
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Figure 7: Impulse Response Function of NK Model with Indeterminacy
(Passive Policy - Pre-Volcker Period)
Figure 8: Impulse Response Function of NK Model with Determinacy
(Active Policy – Post 82 Period)
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